OPINION | Now is the right time to revisit the SANDF's mandate and funding in light of shrinking resources

Fourteen South African soldiers have died in clashes with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in eastern DRC. Several analysts argue that this marks a low point for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and that it is almost too late to implement the reforms needed to restore the military to an institution South Africans can once again take pride in.

The incident recalls the so-called Battle of Bangui in March 2013 during the Central African Republic civil war – a major defeat for the SANDF that led to the Séléka rebels seizing control of the country.

After the historic transition of 1994, SA’s foreign policy shifted from a stance of conflict with its neighbours to one centred on regional relations built on the principles of common destiny, friendship, co-operation and conflict resolution. The South African government sought to take on a leadership role on the continent, creating new opportunities for the SANDF as a military instrument.

Towards the end of the Mandela presidency, SA’s involvement in peace and security operations became a defining feature of its post-1994 foreign policy. The government demonstrated its firm commitment to regional stability by deploying the SANDF in peacekeeping operations – first in Lesotho in 1998, followed by the DRC in 1999 and Burundi in 2001.

However, since 1998 it became evident that the SANDF found it difficult to conduct operations as a declining budget started to constrain the army. This is linked to that between 1995 and 1998, the defence budget was cut by 11.1%, which eventually resulted in a growing mismatch between policy intent and execution.

As a percentage of GDP South African defence spending had been reduced to less than 3% in the mid-1990s, which boiled down to less than 10% of total government spending. The defence budget then further decreased to 1.54% of GDP in 2004/05 and levelled out in 2014/15 at about 1.2% to 1.1% of GDP.

Despite a dwindling defence budget, the government expected the SANDF to support the SAPS as murder and death rates rose to levels comparable to – or in some cases even exceeding – those in high-intensity war zones internationally.

This has placed the SANDF in an almost impossible position, forced to balance its demanding regional deployments with ongoing appeals from politicians and the public to intervene in crime-ridden hotspots where the SAPS is unable to fulfil its constitutional duty to protect South Africans.

Given these constraints and the changing global and regional geopolitical landscape in which the SANDF operated, the government appointed a task team to draft a second defence review – after the South African Defence Review of 1998 – which was finally published as the 2015 South African Defence Review.

The task team made it clear that the decrease in funding levels was problematic, and that inadequate funding would eventually severely compromise the defence capabilities of the SANDF.

They emphasised that the government had to decide on one of two options – approving a greater budget allocation to the SANDF or opting for a scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned with the budget allocation. One thing was clear: SA’s spending was low in terms of comparative international military spending practice.

Despite its budgetary challenges, in 2023, the SANDF was the fifth largest troop-contributing nation in the UN’s operation in the eastern DRC and played a key role in the SADC operation against insurgents in northern Mozambique from 2021 to 2024.

It should also be noted that border protection and support for the SAPS in internal operations have become important and demanding in the SANDF’s activities and responsibilities and can even be regarded as among its primary functions.

However, a major concern is that the SANDF is too often used as a stopgap in SA’s domestic security landscape – hindering its ability to function as a professional, well-equipped armed force with a clear mandate.

For instance, in 2023, politicians called on the SANDF to assist in combating violence linked to zama zamas after the government deployed soldiers in large numbers to curb illegal mining activities.

Even local communities expect the government to use the SANDF internally, adding pressure on the state to consider such deployments. Another recent example of internal deployment was the government’s decision in 2023 to deploy the SANDF to safeguard the coal power plants of Eskom.

In conclusion, it should be clear from the above that there is a mismatch between what is expected of the SANDF at the political level and its budget and capabilities.

Perhaps now is the time to reassess both its mandate and funding, particularly in light of the persistent gap between political expectations and available resources.

• Neethling is a professor in the department of political studies and governance at the University of the Free State