Delivering a public lecture at the University of SA in 2014, Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke asked the question: "How best may we shield appointments of public functionaries to institutions that guard our democracy from the personal preferences of the appointing authority?"

This question was informed by Moseneke's concern regarding the concentration of too much power in the hands of one person - the president. Some people were peeved. Zweli Mkhize, for example, posed a sarcastic question: "At which point should the comments be seen as political statements uttered by a senior judge? Could his comments possibly be construed as a call for an amendment of the constitution?"

Mkhize employed the Socratic method of locating a logically inescapable statement in a question so that the point he is making, although unmistakable, is not directly attributable to him. His statement is clear - that Moseneke must leave political questions to politicians in parliament.

There is no need for us to be bogged down in technicalities but we must at the same time avoid the usual tendency to view the constitution either as a political or legal document.

Upon reaching political settlement regarding the kind of polity the new South Africa was to be, politicians in parliament could not turn their ideas into a constitution without enlisting the knowledge of lawyers in the process of turning political ideals into a legally enforceable document.

Thus, anybody who regards the constitution purely as a political document, or purely as a legal document, needs conceptual help.

As a jurist, Moseneke is perfectly qualified to opine on how our constitution distorts sound governance ideals. Civilised politicians elsewhere in the world don't dismiss a learned opinion glibly.

Nkandla and "Zuptagate" remind us, once again, that Moseneke is right -concentrating too much power in the hands of one person is extremely dangerous.

If our constitution did not grant the president the exclusive authority to appoint and fire ministers, without having to account for it, or without involving another body, would we have ended up with such poor quality ministers as Nathi Nhleko or Faith Muthambi?

Some might ask: how else could ministers be appointed?

A system is possible in which a president would nominate candidates to be interviewed by a new legally authorised body comprising heads of state institutions - such as the chief justice, Chapter 9 Institutions, etc - before they are confirmed by parliament as suitable for ministerial positions.

Such open interviews would be televised so that all of us can see and make up our own minds regarding the quality of ministers the president wants to have around him.

A process of this nature would separate wheat from chaff - right from the onset.

Similarly, our constitution can be amended to place a requirement on the president to explain to and seek permission from parliament before firing a minister from cabinet.

It might seem cumbersome but a system of that kind would most probably have prevented "Nenegate", the stupid presidential decision that cost South Africa billions of rands. Under the proposed system, Zuma's midnight business of firing ministers through short statements would not have been possible.

We all know that Thuli Madonsela's term is expiring this year. With the Guptas in the background, and Zuma still in office, it is not difficult to imagine the kind of person Zuma will appoint as our next public protector.

It was a big mistake for our lawmakers to allow the president to be involved in the appointment of heads of Chapter 9 institutions. These important institutions ought to be independent of the executive. Why is the president involved in appointing their heads?

The lawmakers seem to have been blinded by their anticipation of Nelson Mandela as the next president of South Africa. Thus they did not entertain the real possibility of a corrupt president down the road. Again, the constitution can be amended to give authority to a new body comprising MPs, members of civil society, heads of recognised professional organisations, etc.

Such a body, conducting interviews in the open, cannot possibly appoint a person like Hlaudi Motsoeneng to replace Madonsela as our new public protector. Zuma can do it.

If we do not amend the constitution, it would not be impossible for our country, someday, to fall into the hands of a mad president who appoints fellow asylum dwellers to lead key institutions of our democracy. We must thank Zuma for enabling us to visualise such a possible future.

Moseneke has framed an important crisis prevention question for SA: "How best may we shield appointments of public functionaries to institutions that guard our democracy from the personal preferences of the appointing authority?"